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Evans: Fairness in Federal Adminstrative Disciplinary Proceedings: The C

NOTES
FAIRNESS IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINAR Y
PROCEEDINGS: THE CALL FOR DISCLOSURE UNDER
THE BRADY DOCTRINE*
INTRODUCTION

Anyone employed in an industry regulated by the federal government is
probably subject to the jurisdiction of a federal administrative agency. 1 When
an agency discovers a possible statutory violation, the suspected violator's rights
may be determined in an administrative disciplinary hearing. 2 The disciplinary
hearing is adversarial in nature and is analogous to a criminal trial.3 Typically
a branch of the agency, such as the division of enforcement,4 investigates and
prosecutes the case, and the accused defends against the charges. 5 A finding of
•Editor's Note. This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for the
best student note in the 1983 spring semester.
1. See 1 K. DAvis, ADMNISrm ivE LAW TEr § 1.02 (3d ed. 1972) (individuals are affected
more by administrative process than by judicial process). See also C. MCCORMiCK, HANDBOOK
ON nsm LAW OF EvmENcE § 348 (2d ed. 1972) (administrative trials far outnumber judicial

trials).
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is authorized to police the securities
industry through administrative disciplinary proceedings. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-.28 (1982).
Similarly, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is authorized to enforce the
commodities laws in disciplinary proceedings. See 7 US.C. §§ 9, 13b (1976). Section 9 gives the
Commission authority to serve a complaint upon any person that it has reason to believe is
violating the Commodity Futures Trading Act. The complaint may contain a notice of hearing requiring the person served to show cause why an order should not be issued prohibiting
that party from trading on or subject to the rules of any contract market. Id. § 9. See also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976) (administrative agencies may promulgate
rules and adjudicate in agency hearings). See generally 1 K. DAvIS, supra note 1, at § 1.05 (discussing reasons for developing systems of administrative adjudication); Tew & Freedman,
Practice in Securities and Exchange Commission Investigatory and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, 27 U. MAMI L. REv. 1, 11-18 (1972) (discussing SEC proceedings).
3. See Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 825-26 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (SEC broker-dealer
administrative disciplinary hearings are punitive and quasi-criminal); Charlton v. FTC, 545
F.2d 903, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (disciplinary hearings are punitive, quasi-criminal proceedings). See also 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at § § 7.02-.03 (parties to an agency adjudicatory hearing are bound by the findings of law and fact); Timbers & Garfinkel, Examination of the
Commission's Adjudicatory Process: Some Suggestions, 45 VA. L. REv. 817, 824 (1959) (SEC
disciplinary proceedings are quasi-punitive).
4. Divisions of enforcement act as the investigative and prosecutorial arm of agencies.
In re First Guar. Metals, Co., 2 COMm. Fr. L. REP. (CHH) ff21,074, at 24,340 n.16 (1980).
See Sackheim, Administrative Enforcement of the Federal Commodities Laws By the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 12 SEroN HALL L. REv. 445, 447-49 (1982). See generally
N. KAPLAN, P. FRIEDMAN, R. BENNET, & H. TRAINOR, PARALLEL GRAND JURY AND ADMINIsTRATIVE
AGENCY INvsIGATIONS 27-256 (1981) (discussing the policies and procedures of selected
agencies' divisions of enforcement).
5. For a discussion on litigating administrative proceedings generally, see Prettyman,
How to Try a Dispute Under Adjudication by an Administrative Agency, 45 VA. L. REv. 179
(1959).
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wrongdoing may result in the imposition of severe sanctions against the
accused. 6
Although agency disciplinary hearings are similar to adversarial trials,
agencies exercise their adjudicative powers unencumbered by typical rules of
judicial procedure. 7 The most notable procedural tools denied the accused are
discovery devices.8 Agencies, however, enjoy a wide array of discovery devices."
Commentators have criticized this imbalance and have suggested that respondents in administrative actions should be afforded full discovery rights. 10
While most agencies continue to deny non-agency parties useful discovery devices,1' the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 12 recently
broke this tradition by ordering its Division of Enforcement to produce all
evidence exculpating the accused.'
The Commission based its order on a doctrine that has developed from
6. After the administrative law judge has heard the evidence, the CFTC has the authority
to impose a variety of sanctions. It may prohibit the violator from trading on or subject to
the rules of any contract market, suspend or revoke the registration of CFTC registrants,
and/or assess the violator a civil penalty of not more than $100,000 for each violation of the
federal commodity laws. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976). The SEC may impose sanctions amounting to
revocation of license or denial of registration. It may also bar an association with a brokerdealer or place limitations on the activities or functions of a person or entity. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(4), (6) (1976).
7. See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. See also J. ABSHIRE, A QUEST FOR FAIRNESS
AND EFFICIENCY: A STUDY OF DISCOVERY IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 62 (1972).
8. No constitutional right to pre-trial discovery in administrative proceedings exists. The
Administrative Procedure Act does not provide for discovery, and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not apply to agencies. Silverman v. CFTC, 549 F.2d 28, 33 (7th Cir. 1977). See,
e.g., NLRB v. Hackenberger, 531 F.2d 364 (6th Cir.) (SEC respondents not entitled to pretrial discovery), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); NLRB v. Valley Mold Co., 530 F.2d 693, 69495 (6th Cir.) (allowance of pretrial discovery is a matter of agency discretion), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 824 (1976). But cf. NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466, 481 (2d Cir. 1976)
(discovery may be necessary if respondent is clearly prejudiced by denial of information).
9. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(d) & 556(c) (1976) (providing authority for agency use of subpoenas); 17 C.F.R. §§ 10.42, .44 (1982) (CFTC's rules of pretrial discovery provide that the use of pre-trial discovery devices by non-agency party is largely
within discretion of administrative law judge); 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-.28 (1982) (SEC Rules of
Practice); 17 C.F.R. §§ 203.1-.8 (1982) (SEC investigative rules). See also J. ABSHiRE, supra note
7, at 65-68 (discussing the inquisitorial power of federal agencies); Letter from A. F.
Mathews to the SEC Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices (May 23,
1972), reprinted in A. MATHEWS, SECURITIES LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURrrIES LAws
325, 336-37 (P.L.I. 1977) (enforcement staff given unfair advantage due to imbalance of discovery powers) [hereinafter cited as LETTER].
10. See 1970-71 REPORT ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMAMENDATION No. 21: DiscovERY IN ACENCy ADJUDICATION 44 (July 1971); Berger, Discovery in
Administrative Proceedings: Why Agencies Should Catch Up With the Courts, 46 A.B.A. J.
74 (1960); Kaufman, Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace with Modern Court-Developed
Techniques Against Delay?- A Judge's View, 12 AD. L. REv. 103 (1959-60).
11. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
12. The CFTC is an independent federal regulatory agency modeled after the SEC. The
CFTC was mandated by Congress to administer and enforce the commodities laws in order
to protect the investing public from abusive and criminal practices. See Sackheim, supra note
4, at 447-49.
13. In re First Guar. Metals Co., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) ff 21,074 (1980); In re
First Nat'l Monetary Corp. ScMonex Int'l, Ltd., Nos. 79-56, 79-57, (CFTC Nov. 12, 1981).
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the United States Supreme Court decision in Brady v. Maryland. 4 In Brady
the Court held that due process requires the prosecution to disclose any evidence mitigating criminal defendants' guilt or punishment.1 5 Administrative
agencies, however, have historically dismissed any constitutional disclosure requirement without directly addressing the Brady doctrine's applicability to
administrative proceedings.6 Thus, the extent to which the Brady doctrine
may function as a discovery device in administrative hearings has yet to be
explored.
Although the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's order provides
precedent for applying Brady in administrative proceedings, other agencies
are neither bound by the decision nor have they followed the Commission's
lead.17 This reluctance to apply Brady stems from the uncertainty regarding
agencies' duty to disclose under the doctrine.' 8 To foster the adoption of
Brady's constitutional rule throughout the administrative field, the duty to
disclose should be defined and limited in a manner appropriate for administrative use.
This note will review the Supreme Court's ruling in Brady v. Maryland"9
and the subsequent development of the Brady doctrine. The fact-finding process employed in agency enforcement proceedings will then be examined. This
discussion will reveal that present discovery rules in administrative procedure
are inadequate to prepare respondents for adversarial hearings. This inadequacy becomes apparent when the procedural safeguards afforded in
criminal cases are compared to those available in administrative hearings. To
facilitate the administrative application of Brady, this note will suggest guidelines for defining the scope of the Brady doctrine's disclosure requirements
in agency proceedings.
Tim Brady DoanuiN
20
Emanating from the due process clause of the United States Constitution,
the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence began as a narrow, strictly defined
restriction on prosecutorial misconduct." 1 The duty has developed into a broad,

14. 373 US. 83 (1963).
15. Id. at 87.
16. See e.g., Allied Chem. Corp., 75 F.T.C. 1055 (1969); In re Haight & Co., 44 S.E.C. 481
(Brady does not permit a fishing expedition into prosecution's files), aff'd, No. 71-637 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Jaffee & Co., 44 S.E.C. 285 (1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1971). But see Conners
v. SEC, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fa. SEc. L. RP. (CCH) ff 96,871A (D.D.C. May 18, 1979) (SEC
Enforcement Division concedes it should comply with Brady).
17. Since the CFTC rendered its Brady order, there have been no new agency decisions
calling for Brady disclosure. See Sackheim, supra note 4, at 455 (Commission's order may be
invoked as precedent in cases before the CFTC).
18. See J. AnssmE, supra note 7, at 83 (Brady doctrine has not yet evolved into a welldefined discovery mechanism).
19. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
20. U.S.
21. The
294 U.S. 103
presentation

CONsr. amend. V.
duty to disclose arose from the Supreme Court's ruling in Mooney v. Holohan,
(1935). The Court stated that the deliberate deception of court and jury by the
of testimony known to be perjured is "inconsistent with the rudimentary de-
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affirmative obligation for prosecutors to reveal evidence that is materially favorable to the accused.2 2 The shift in the Supreme Court's analysis regarding
prosecutorial disclosure requirements occurred in Brady v. Maryland.23
Development of the Brady Doctrine
In Brady the defendant was charged with murder and upon conviction
faced the death penalty. Though admitting his participation in the crime, the
defendant testified that Boblit, his companion who was tried separately, had
actually killed the victim.24 Despite defendant's plea for a verdict without

capital punishment, the jury returned a guilty verdict and recommended the
25

death penalty.

Prior to trial, defense counsel had requested the prosecutor to disclose
Boblit's extrajudicial statements. 26 The prosecutor revealed most of these
statements but withheld one statement containing Boblit's admission that he
had strangled the victimY2 After the trial, defense counsel learned of the with-

held statement and moved for a new trial, alleging suppression of evidence.2
Focusing on defendant's right to a fair trial, 29 the Supreme Court affirmed the
state court's reversal of Brady's conviction. s0 The Court held that the prosecution's suppression of requested evidence favorable to an accused violates due
31
process when the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.
mands of justice." Id. at 112. See also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutor's
knowing failure to correct perjured testimony relating to credibility of witness violates
due process); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (expanding Mooney by holding that prosecutor's knowing failure to correct inculpatory, perjured testimony violates due process); Pyle
v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942) (reaffirming Mooney). See generally Note, The Prosecutor's
Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964) (discussing the historical development of the duty to disclose).
22. See generally Note, Pretrial Identification Procedures: The Expanded Duty to Disclose Favorable Evidence, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 508, 510 (1975); Comment, Materiality and
Defense Requests: Aids in Defining the Prosecutor'sDuty of Disclosure, 59 IOWA L. REv. 433,
435 (1975).
23. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the Supreme Court shifted its focus from prosecutorial
misconduct as a basis for a finding of violation of due process to the fairness of the proceedings for the defendant. Id. at 87-88. See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 n.10
(1976).
24. 373 U.S. at 84.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Because the undisclosed statement was unsigned and inadmissible at trial, the
prosecutor concluded that Brady Would not be prejudiced by its suppression. 226 Md. 422, 427,
174 A.2d 167, 170 (Md. Ct. App. 1961).
28. 373 U.S. at 84-85.
29. Id. at 87.
30. Id. at 90. The Court agreed with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals of Maryland
that remand should only be for he purpose of reconsidering punishment since nothing in
Boblit's confession could have reduced Brady's offense below first degree murder. Id.
31. Id. at 87. The Court declared due process was violated whether the prosecution
withheld the evidence in good faith or bad faith. Id. For a general discussion of Brady, see
Note, supra note 21; Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose,
40 U. CHI. L. REV. 112 (1972).
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The decision in Brady pertained only to cases in which defense counsel had
requested specific exculpatory material in the prosecution's possession.3 2 The
Supreme Court significantly expanded the prosecution's Brady disclosure
obligation in United States v. Agurs.3 3 In Agurs the Court declared the Brady
doctrine applies to three distinct situations. 4 First, the prosecution must reveal
to the defendant any information that might affect the credibility of a government witness. 35 This requirement includes notice of inconsistent statements,
knowledge of witness' intent to perjure himself, or any plea bargain promise of
leniency that the prosecutor makes to a witness. 36 It does not, however, require
that all information concerning government witnesses be made available to
37
the defense.
The second situation encompasses cases in which the defense makes a pretrial request for specific evidence. 38 A specific request puts the prosecution on
notice of the exact information sought by the defense.3 9 The prosecution is
therefore under a higher duty to respond to the request than if no request or a
general request were made. 40 Because of this higher duty, the prosecution's
failure to respond to a specific, relevant request is seldom, if ever, excusable. 41
The third situation to which Brady applies is typified by the facts of Agurs.
The prosecution in Agurs failed to disclose allegedly favorable evidence that
the defense had not specifically requested. 42 Absent a specific request for evi32. 373 U.S. at 87.
33. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). In Agurs the defendant was charged with second-degree murder
for the stabbing death of the deceased. Id. at 98. The defendant claimed that she stabbed the
deceased in self-defense. Several months after conviction, defense counsel moved for a new
trial on the grounds that the prosecution failed to disclose the deceased's past criminal
record which revealed the deceased's violent nature and tended to prove the claim of selfdefense. Id. at 100. Defense counsel had not made a specific pre-trial request for this evidence.
Id. at 99.
34. Id. at 103.
35. Id. at 103-04.
36. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (prosecution's disclosure of evidence concerning witnesses' credibility required when such witnesses' testimony may be
determinative of guilt or innocence); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 74-75 (1967) (prosecution
erred in failing to disclose evidence of rape victim's promiscuity that could have been used as
specific acts of misconduct to impeach the victim); United States v. Houston, 339 F. Supp. 762,
766 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (prosecution must disclose to defendant at trial the criminal records
of prosecution witnesses); United States v. Eley, 335 F. Supp. 353, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (defendant must be allowed to copy any information helpful to its case in prosecution's possession). But cf. United States v. Brown, 582 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir.) (prosecution does not violate
Brady by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence when the defense already has the facts
essential to enable it to take advantage of such evidence), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978).
37. See United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
38. 427 US. at 104.
39. Id. at 106.
40. Id. Other lower courts before Agurs recognized a difference in the duty to disclose
depending upon whether a general or specific request was made. See United States v. Keogh,
391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968).
41. 427 U.S. at 106.
42. Id. Prior to Agurs, the Court had not decided whether the prosecutor was constitutionally required to disclose any favorable evidence absent a specific request. Id. Following
Brady many courts had advocated abolishing the specific request requirement. See Unit~d
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dence the prosecution's duty to disclose still arises, but only if the evidence is so
clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it would give the prosecution
notice of a duty to produce.

3

Enforcing the Brady Doctrine:Standards of Materiality
Theoretically, the Brady doctrine supports the proposition that fundamental fairness requires the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Revelation of
favorable evidence by the prosecution comports with the notion that an adversary trial should function not as a game of blindman's bluff, but as a means
to ascertain the truth. 44 In most instances, however, the prosecution's discretion
and ethical integrity determine the extent of Brady's constitutional protection
for the defendant. For example, when the defense is unaware of favorable
evidence held by the government, an unscrupulous or overzealous prosecutor
might decide that Brady disclosure is unwarranted and suppress the evidence
to ensure successful prosecution of the case.45 The Court's failure to adequately
address prosecutorial misconduct in concealing exculpatory evidence has
led some commentators to conclude that Brady is unenforceable.46 Nevertheless,
the Court did fashion a "standard of materiality" for each of the three Brady
categories for determining whether disclosure of evidence is required under
4

the Brady doctrine.

7

First, the government is compelled to produce evidence regarding the
credibility of a witness.48 Strongly disapproving of the use of perjured testimony,4 9 the Agurs Court held that discovery of such evidence after trial would
warrant a new trial if any reasonable likelihood exists that the false testimony
States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir.
1968); Castleberry v. Crisp, 414 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Okla. 1976). See generally The Prosecutor's
Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence in the Absence of a Focused Request from the Defence - United States v. Agurs, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 319 (1976) (discussing the Court's decision
to limit the duty to disclose absent a specific request).
43. 427 U.S. at 106.
44. See generally Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution:Sporting Event or Quest for Truth,
1963 WAsn. U.L.Q. 279; Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
45. 427 U.S. at 117 (Marshall, J. dissenting):
The rule creates little, if any, incentive for the prosecutor conscientiously to determine
whether his files contain evidence helpful to the defense. Indeed, the rule reinforces
the natural tendency of the prosecutor to overlook evidence favorable to the defense,
and creates an incentive for the prosecutor to resolve close questions of disclosure in
favor of concealment.

Id. But see

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1979) (the responsibility
of a public prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict).
46. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 117 (Marshall, J. dissenting); Beatty, The Ability to Suppress Exculpatory Evidence: Let's Cut Off the Prosecutor'sHands, 17 IDAHO L. Rv. 237, 242-43 (1981).
Adlerstein, Ethics, Federal Prosecutors,and Federal Courts: Some Recent Problems, 6 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 755, 766-67 (1978).
47. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-14.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
49. The Court believed a strict standard was appropriate in these cases because "they
involve a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process." 427 U.S. at 104.
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could have affected the jury's judgment. 50 Second, when the prosecution receives
a specific request for Brady material,51 failure to respond will warrant a new
trial if the suppressed evidence might have affected the trial's outcome.r 2 Third,
if no request or a general request for exculpatory information has been made
and undisclosed favorable evidence is subsequently discovered, 3 a new trial will
be granted only when the undisclosed evidence creates a reasonable doubt as
to the defendant's guilt.5 4
The prosecution's duty to disclose in the first two situations is quite high.
The Court stated that when a specific request for material is made, the prosecution can either furnish the information to the defense or submit the problem
to the trial judge.5s Although the duty to disclose is much lower when no request or a general request is made, the prosecution's obligation to disclose is a
continuing one.5 6 Emphasizing the difficulty of predicting the significance of an
item's evidentiary value at trial, the Court declared that the prudent
prosecutor should resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.57
The Administrative Process
As a governmental authority, an administrative agency has the power to
affect private parties' rights through adjudication or rulemaking.58 For
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)5 9 has passed rules requiring participants in the securities markets to register with the Commission.
If an SEC investigation uncovers evidence of a statutory violation by a
registrant, the SEC may revoke the violator's registration through the adjudication process. 60 Although SEC hearings are similar to adversarial trials, the nonagency parties have virtually no means to discover the information necessary
50. Id. at 103. The Court characterized this standard as low for the defense in that it
would be relatively easy for the defense to meet this standard and strict for prosecution because it would bear a heavy burden to justify the failure to disclose this type of evidence. Id.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 3841.
52. 427 U.S. at 104.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 4243.
54. 427 U.S. at 112-13. Justice Marshall argued that this standard placed too great a
burden on the defendant. Id. at 115-16. See Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose After
United States v. Agurs, 1977 ILL. L.F. 690, 698-99.
55. 427 US. at 106.
56. Id. at 107.
57. Id. at 108.
58. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(2)(a) (1976); 1 K. DAvis, supra note
1, § 1.01.
59. Several federal statutes authorize the SEC to police the securities industry. See The
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976); The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act), id. §§ 78a-78kk, amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, id. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2,
78m, 78ff (Supp. 1977) and Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act, id.
§ 78m, 780; The Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act), id. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-27 (1976);
The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPC Act), id. §§ 78aaa-78111.
60. Three principal adjudicatory enforcement mechanisms are available to the SEC.
The first enforcement tool is public or private administrative disciplinary proceedings. See
17 C.F.R. H9 201.1-.27 (1982) (SEC Rules of Practice); Touche, Ross & Co., SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5459 (Feb. 25, 1974). See also In re Emanuel Fields, SEC Securities Act Release No.
5404 [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RFP. (CCH) 79,407 (June 18, 1973). The second procedure is a civil injunctive action. 17 C.F.R. §202.5(b) (1979). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf
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to formulate an adequate defense. 6 1 A review of administrative discovery and
disclosure provisions reveals an unfair adjudicative advantage in favor of the
agency.
Discovery and Disclosure in Administrative Proceedings
Administrative agencies use a variety of methods to discover information
necessary to exercise their regulatory functions. The subpoena power of administrative agencies during the investigatory stages of an enforcement pro62
ceeding is one such discovery device. For example, an SEC enforcement staff,
upon finding a possible violation of the federal securities acts, may institute an
informal investigation of the suspected violator. 63 If the preliminary findings
warrant further investigation,64 the enforcement staff may recommend formal
investigation to the Commission and issue notice of such investigation. In
addition, the staff may invoke the subpoena power available to administrative
agencies to continue the fact-finding process. 5 During these investigatory stages
the suspected violator has no correlative right to issue subpoenas.6 6 Thus, the
SEC and other regulatory agencies have the power to compel production of
evidence before filing a formal complaint. 67 As opposed to the suspect, the
agency is usually quite well informed of the facts before issuing its complaint.68
Sulfur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968). The third mechanism is criminal prosecution. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1982).
See also United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969).
61. See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 4.
63. 17 C.F.R. §§ 203.1-.8 (1982) (SEC Investigative Rules). SEC interviewing techniques
have been criticized as clear examples of highly biased and suggestive interrogations which
produce desired but inaccurate responses. See Freedman & Sporkin, Th Securities and Exchange Commission's Enforcement Program:A Debate on the Enforcement Process, 38 WASH.
& L L. REV. 781, 783-84 (1981). For further discussion of SEC investigatory procedures see
Lowenfels, Securities and Exchange Commission Investigations: The Need for Reform, 45 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 575 (1971); Markham, Investigations Under the Commodity Exchange Act,
81 AD. L. REv. 285 (1979).
64. Even when an investigation is not followed by a formal SEC enforcement, it may cause
substantial problems for the party investigated. Rumors regarding the subjects of an investigation often unfairly tarnish personal and business reputations. See Mathews, Effective
Defense of SEC Investigations: Laying the Foundation for Successful Disposition of Subsequent
Civil, Administrative, and Criminal Proceedings,24 EMORY L.J. 567, 570 (1975).
65. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(d), 556(c) (1976). See Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 827 U.S. 186 (1946) (agency subpoenas may be issued if the inquiry is one the demanding agency is authorized by law to make and materials specified are
relevant); SEC. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1970) (agency need
not show probable cause to obtain enforcement of subpoenas); Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d 861
(8th Cir. 1961) (determination of relevance is based upon the purpose of the investigation,
which is determined by the agency investigator).
66. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(b)(1) (1982) (SEC Subpoena Rules) (non-agency party may
request issuance of subpoena at hearing only). See also J. ABSHIRE, supra note 7, at 69 (agency
rules confine respondent's right to subpoena to actual hearings).
67. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-.27 (1982) (SEC Rules of Practice); see also Dixon, Practice and
Procedure Before the Federal Trade Commission, 9 N.Y.L.F. 31, 47 (1963); Tew & Freedman,
supra note 2, at 4-6.
68. J. ABsHnm, supra note 7, at 67-68.
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The deposition is another discovery tool available to administrative agencies
but unavailable to respondents. 9 An agency enforcement staff may take ex
parte investigative depositions of prospective witnesses before the hearing, but
the accused is virtually barred from taking discovery depositions.7 0 When
witnesses will be unable to appear at the hearing, some agencies allow respondents to depose the witnesses to preserve their testimony.71 These depositions, however, are not designated for discovery purposes and are further
limited by the discretionary power of the administrative law judge to deny
their use.7 2 Consequently, depositions do not serve the accused as a useful discovery device in administrative proceedings.
The respondent's lack of discovery tools in administrative proceedings provides agencies with an unjust procedural advantage.7 3 The multi-faceted role
agencies play in adversarial administrative cases amplifies this procedural advantage.7 4 Agencies perform prosecutorial functions by investigating alleged
infractions and bringing enforcement actions.75 By imposing remedial and
punitive sanctions, agencies assume the judicial function. Because the accused
is denied useful discovery devices to offset the agencies' advantage, the Brady
doctrine should be implemented in the administrative field to provide, at least,
for the discovery of exculpatory evidence.
The Government's Obligation to Disclose
The lack of available discovery devices in administrative proceedings has
led respondents to look to the government's disclosure obligations when gathering information necessary for defense preparation. With the Freedom of In69. See 17 C.F.R. § 10.44(a) (1982) (CFTC Rules of Practice) (deposition may be allowed
at discretion of administrative law judge if material witness is unable to attend a hearing);
id. § 201.15 (SEC Rules of Practice) (deposition request within discretion of administrative
law judge).
70. See NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970) (NLRB deposition provision not for purpose of pre-trial discovery); Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of
SEC Administrative Enforcement Proceedings, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 215, 253 (1980) (SEC pretrial procedures virtually bar respondents from taking discovery depositions).
71. See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 201.15 (1982) (SEC Rules of Practice). Even if a deposition is
permitted, it cannot later be introduced into evidence at the hearing unless the proponent
establishes one of the following:
(i) that the witness is dead, (ii) that the witness is out of the United States, unless it
appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; (iii) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity or imprisonment; (iv) that the party offering the deposition has been unable

to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (v) upon application and
notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the
interests of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony
of witnesses orally in open hearing, to allow the deposition to be used.
Id. at § 201.15(f).
72.
73.

See supra note 69.
See sources cited supra note 10.
74. See M. CARuow, THE BACKGROUND OF ADmNISTrATIV LAw 16 (1948); Bagley, Introduction: A New Body of Law in an Era of Industry Growth, 27 EMORY L.J. 849, 851 (1978).
75. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
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formation Act (FOIA)6 Congress imposed certain disclosure obligations on
federal agencies so that the public could become informed about the agencies'
policies and actions.- Although the FOIA does not specifically relate to discovery, respondents in administrative actions have innovatively attempted to
use the Act as a discovery device.
The FOIA requires federal agencies to make available all requested government records in the agencies' possession.7 8 Disclosure is not required, however, if
the requested documents are within any of the nine FOIA exemptions to public
disclosure.79 Generally, agencies have incorporated the nine exemptions in
their regulations, thus establishing specific categories of confidential information.0 Though information may fall within an FOIA exemption, the agency
may still release the information if it finds the need for public disclosure outweighs the private interest in nondisclosure."' Private litigants have attempted
to transform FOA disclosure into a discovery device by introducing this
balancing approach in administrative proceedings. Courts have rejected this
novel approach and pointed out that the standard is the interest of the public
in disclosure, not the interest of the private litigant.82 Courts also have been reluctant to impose procedural requirements on the agency under the FOIA in
order to protect the pre-trial interests of private litigants8 3
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
77. The FOIA requires each federal agency to which it applies to make certain information available to the public in the Federal Register. The required disclosures include descriptions of its organization and general course of operation, its rules of procedure, its substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and any amendment, revision or repeal of the foregoing. Id. § 662(c)(1).
78. Id.
79. Id. at § 552(b)(l)-(9).
80. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 200.80(b)(l)-(9) (1982) (SEC rules incorporating FOIA exemptions).
81. See e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 2.13(d) (1981) (Dept. of Interior); 49 C.F.R. § 7.61 (1981) (Dept. of
Transportation).
82. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) (private litigant not entitled
to greater consideration under FOIA than public); Columbia Packing Co. v. Department of
Agri., 563 F.2d 495 (Ist Cir. 1977).
83. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. SEC, [1975-76 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 1 95,566 (D.D.C. May 28, 1976) (court denied motion to enjoin SEC
evidentiary hearing until disposition of FOIA request despite private litigant's claim of irreparable harm resulting from inability to acquire the requested materials); Steadman Sec.
Corp. v. SEC, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 193,735 (D.D.C. Jan. 25,
1973) (court refused to exercise jurisdiction to enjoin agency proceedings pending resolution
of a FOIA request).
During enforcement proceedings, the SEC forbids FOIA disclosure of investigatory materials not otherwise available through the limited administrative discovery procedures.
See e.g., Parker/Hunter, Inc. v. SEC, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
198,279, at 91,780 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 1981); John A. Jenkins, FOIA Release No. 11 (June 11,
1975) [1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fin. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,203, at 85,418; see also Morrison
& Paul, The Freedom of Information Act As a Discovery Device, reprinted in NEW TRENDS IN
SECURITIES LITIGATION 239, 248-49 (P.L.I. 1979) (records remain nonpublic while prospect of
relevant enforcement action continues). After enforcement action has been taken, the SEC
generally allows full FOIA disclosure of evidentiary materials. Id. at 248. Nevertheless, where
full disclosure of investigative materials would reveal investigative techniques or informants,
such disclosure is not necessary. See Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972); Commercial
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Another governmental disclbsure obligati6n invoked by respondents in administrative proceedings was established by the Supreme Court in Jencks v.
United States. 4 In Jencks the Court formulated a general rule of disclosure,
holding that the defendant is entitled to all prior statements of witnesses which
concern the same events as their trial testimonyss Moreover, the Court held
that the prosecution could not justify withholding requested statements by
asserting they contained privileged government secrets. Congress subsequently
modified this latter holding in the Jencks Act. 6 Nevertheless, the Act incorporates the case's basic holding, permitting the defendant to demand production
87
of any prior statement of a witness which relates to his trial testimony.
Although the decision which spawned the Jencks Act was in a criminal
proceeding, courts subsequently reversed agency refusals to apply Jencks in adjudicatory administrative hearings.88 The courts noted that fundamental
fairness mandated disclosure of such evidence in an administrative proceeding."9 The Jencks Act cannot be used as a pre-trial discovery device, however, because it becomes operative only after the hearings have begun and the
witness has testified. 90 The Act, nonetheless, does place some obligation on the
government to disclose. By recognizing similarities between criminal trials and
administrative enforcement actions, courts have indicated that imposing pro91
cedural safeguards on enforcement actions may be necessary to ensure fairness.
Envelope Mfg. Co. v. SEC, 450 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1971). But see F.T.C. v. Grolier Inc., 51
U.S.L.W. 4660 (1983) (Federal Trade Commission attorney's work product compiled during
investigation need not be disclosed under FOIA even after litigation is terminated).
84. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). Jencks was accused of filing false noncommunist affidavits with
the NLRB. Section 9(h) of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(1976)) required each labor union officer to file an affidavit stating that he was not a member
of or affiliated with the Communist Party. 61 Stat. 143, 146, repealed by Pub. L. 86-257,
§ 201(d), 73 Stat. 519, 525 (1959). Jencks was convicted of giving false information to the
government. 855 U.S. at 658-59. At trial the judge denied Jencks' request for FBI reports
which two prosecution witnesses had made before the trial concerning their communist
activities with Jencks. Id. at 665. Because of this denial, the Court reversed the appellate
court's affirmance of the conviction.
85. 858 US. at 668.
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 8500 (1976).
87.

Id.

88. See NLR.B v. Adhesive Prod. Corp., 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958); Communist Party of
the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
89. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d
314, 327, n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1958); see also FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143
(1940).
90. The Jencks rule has been codified for the purposes of administrative disciplinary proceedings. The federal regulation provides:
[A]fter a witness called by the attorney for the interested Division of the Commission
has given direct testimony in a hearing, any other party may request and obtain the
production of any statement, or part thereof, of such witness pertaining to his direct
testimony, in the possession of the Division, subject, however, to the limitations applicable to the production of witnesses' statements under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 8500.
91. 17 C.F.R. § 201.11.1 (1982). See J. ABsH=, supra note 7, at 81-88. Cf. Comment, The
Aftermath of the Jencks Case, 11 STAN. L. Rlv. 297, 828 (1959) (Jencks should apply in all
cases in which the government prosecutes a violation of law).
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The Punitive Nature of Agency
Proceedings: The Criminal Law Analogy
Courts and commentators have suggested that administrative disciplinary
hearings are similar to criminal trials because of the punitive nature of many
agency proceedings. 92 A leading authority on administrative law has noted that
agency decisions can have consequences equally as serious as a short term of
imprisonment. 93 Objecting to the description of disciplinary proceedings as
"quasi-criminal" and the resulting sanctions as "quasi-penal," agencies maintain that disciplinary proceedings are remedial and not penal in nature. 94 The
interests that administrative respondents seek to protect, however, are often as
vital as those of criminal defendants. 9 For example, revocation of an individual's license to participate in a regulated market may be as devastating as a
criminal sentence or fine. 9 6 When severe sanctions may be imposed by an
agency, non-agency parties need greater procedural safeguards.
Respondents in agency disciplinary proceedings, nevertheless, are afforded
far fewer procedural safeguards than criminal defendants. In addition to benefiting from Brady disclosure requirements, criminal defendants are presumed
innocent until proven guilty,97 enjoy a privilege against self-incrimination, 91
and must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.99 In contrast, an administrative respondent is not presumed innocent and has only a limited
privilege against self-incrimination.1° Furthermore, the agency must traditionally meet only a preponderance of the evidence standard in proving its case. 101
92. See supra note 3.
93. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 288 (1976).
94. The SEC asserts that disciplinary proceedings are not penal but are remedial since
they protect public interests. See Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1963); Blaise
D'Antoni & Ass'n. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1961).
95. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC. 603 F.2d 1126, 1139 (5th Cir. 1979) (exclusion from the
industry is a penalty); Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 180 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976)
(revocation of registration has significant penal component), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
See also United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (SEC disciplinary proceedings are truly
penal); United States ex. rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943) (punitive ends may be
pursued in civil proceedings).
96. See supra notes 93 and 95.
97. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 52 (1972).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. E.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (a person may lose his fifth amendment plea in regard to his own personal records if he entrusts them to the possession of a
third person such as an accountant); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (fifth amendment
privilege against self incrimination may be invoked only as to personal testimony or records,
not corporate records); United States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959) (privilege does
not apply to a "one-man" corporation).
101. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 355. E.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97-102
(1981) (Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976), makes the preponderance
of the evidence standard applicable to agency adjudication covered by the Act); Sea Island
Broadcasting Corp. v. SEC, 627 F.2d 240, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (traditional standard of proof
in administrative proceedings is the preponderance of evidence).
Growing concern for administrative respondent's due process rights has led several courts
to provide respondents with increased procedural safeguards. In particular, courts have
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In determining the boundaries of administrative due process, courts have
engaged in a balancing test, weighing the government's interest in administrative efficiency against the private interest to be protected. 10 2 The gravity of the
loss threatened when an agency proceeding may result in the respondent's
exclusion from an industry necessitates greater procedural safeguards. 03 The
administrative versiono4 of the Brady doctrine would provide an important
safeguard for private litigants without significantly affecting administrative
efficiency. 0 5
Brady's APPLICATION

IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE

PRocEss: DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE

DuTY

TO DIscLOsE

Applying the Brady doctrine to agency adjudicatory proceedings appears to
be directed by Brady itself. Although the Brady doctrine originated in a
criminal context, the broad basis of the Brady decision indicates that the Su-

raised the burden of proof in cases in which respondents face quasi-criminal punishment
based on only circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979)
(due process requires "clear and convincing" evidence in civil commitment proceedings in
part because of resulting social stigma); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 828 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Environmental Defense Fund v. Rusckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (judicial review of administrative action touching on "fundamental personal
interests in life, health and liberty" should be stricter than review of case involving only
economic interests). See also Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79 HAgv. L. REv. 914, 919-20 (1966).
102. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (extent to which procedural due process

must be afforded is determined by balancing individual interest in avoiding loss against
governmental interest in summary adjudication).
103. See supra note 101.
104. See Lir=a supra note 9, at 335 (agencies should produce any exculpatory evidence
within the administrative application of the Brady doctrine).
105. The Brady doctrine would provide greater protection to administrative respondents

than it does to criminal defendants. Because the criminal accused is tried by jury, courts have
suggested that the exculpatory evidence must be admissable under the Federal Rules of
Evidence before the Brady disclosure duty is triggered. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 101-02; Giles
v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 74 (1967); Brady, 373 U.S. at 85. But see Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F.
Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (rejecting admissibility as a factor in determining Brady disclosure questions). For a discussion of when the duty to disclose arises in criminal trials, see
Note, People v. Rutherford: The Prosecution'sDuty to Disclose, 6 GOLDEN GATE 851, 857-58
(1976) (conviction will not be reversed under the Brady rule unless the defense shows the
suppressed evidence is admissible).
Because administrative respondents are tried by administrative law judges in agency proceedings to which the Federal Rules of Evidence generally do not apply, administrative law
judges have wide discretion in determining what evidence is admissible. See Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(1)-(7), (d) (1976) (persons presiding at hearing may receive

relevant evidence). Thus, the federal evidentiary rules do not prevent the administrative law
judge from assessing the probative value of any evidence which may be arguably exculpatory.
Also, agency rules with respect to the presentation and admissibility of evidence are generally
much less restrictive than the federal rules. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.351 (1979) (Federal Communica-

tions Commission rules of evidence provide that the rules of evidence governing non-jury
civil trials apply, but may be relaxed to serve ends of justice); 46 C.F.R. §§ 502.154, .156
(1979) (Federal Maritime Commissions rules make admissible all evidence except that which
the presiding officer deems cumulative or productive of undue delay).
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preme Court intended the rule to be followed in other areas. 10 6 The purpose of
the Brady doctrine is to ensure due process for the accused and to avoid unfair
trials. '1 7 Without the doctrine, the accused could be deprived of information
that might exonerate him or reduce his punishment. By articulating the Brady
doctrine in terms of fairness and due process, the Court invited its incorporation into the "fundamentals of fair play" which traditionally govern administrative proceedings. 08
In the past, courts have been reluctant to impose procedural technicalities, such as the Brady doctrine, on agencies. For example, in North American
Corp. v. NLRB,10 9 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with the
argument that Brady requires the National Labor Relations Board to disclose
at the completion of a case any evidence inconsistent with the evidence presented.Y0 In rejecting this contention, the court did not state that Brady was
inapplicable to administrative proceedings; rather it declared that Brady did
not require the prosecution to "comb his files" for evidence which might be
favorable to the defense."'
Similarly, agency rationale in deciding Brady claims arising in administrative hearings has been in accord with that of the North American Rockwell
court. Rather than expressly finding Brady inapplicable to administrative proceedings, agencies have held that Brady does not permit the accused to conduct
a "fishing expedition" into the prosecution's files.112 This avoidance of the substantive question of Brady's administrative application reflects agencies' concern
over the impact of the disclosure requirement on administrative adjudicative
efficiency. 1 ' The lack of an assertive statement rejecting or affirming the administrative use of Brady has shrouded the doctrine in uncertainty.
Recently, however, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
called for the administrative application of the Brady doctrine. In the case of
In re Guaranty Metals Co." 4 the accused was charged with a violation of the
Commodity Exchange Act." 5 In response to a pre-trial request for all exculpatory evidence, the chief administrative law judge issued an order requiring the
CFTC Division of Enforcement to provide respondents with all Brady

106.

See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971)

(supporting the ex-

tension of Brady to suppression by investigative agencies).
107. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
108. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d
314, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
109. 389 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1968).
110. Id. at 869.
111. Id. The court concluded that the question of Brady's application to administrative
proceedings is not a constitutional issue. Id.
112. See supra note 16.
113. Agencies have historically resisted the imposition of court-like rules of procedure on the grounds that it would impede the effectiveness of their regulatory function.
See J. ABsITIRa, supra note 7, at 61.
114. 2 COMM. Fur. L. RFP. (CCH) 21,074 (1980).
115. Id. at 24,334. First Guaranty was consolidated on interlocutory appeal with In re
First Nat'l Monetary Corp., and Monex Int'l, Ltd. because the cases had common questions
of law and fact. Id. at n.l.
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materialY' 0 The judge noted that because the Brady request was specific, it gave
the Division of Enforcement sufficient notice of the evidence sought."' On
appeal to the CFTC, the respondent charged that the Division of Enforcement had failed to comply with the Brady requests.""' Affirming the administrative law judge's order, the CFTC held that because Brady was premised on due
process grounds, its principles should apply to those administrative enforcement actions which may result in substantial sanctions.'19
While it is not binding on other agencies, the CFTC decision requiring
Brady disclosure is persuasive precedent in the administrative field.1 20 Such
precedent, however, may be ignored because agencies have historically viewed
Brady as imposing an expansive duty to disclose evidence.'x ' Therefore Brady
should be positioned in the administrative arena as a well-defined, minimal
prosecutorial obligation of disclosure. This objective may be achieved by carefully limiting the scope of the disclosure requirement.
General vs. Specific Request for Brady Material
In Agurs the Supreme Court declared that the prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory evidence increased or decreased according to the specificity
of the Brady request. 22 A specific request creates the greatest duty of disclosure
while a general request imposes a lesser duty. 23 Thus, the burden on a division
of enforcement would be high only when respondent made a specific request.
In First Guaranty the CFTC labeled the Brady request specific, thereby
triggering the highest standard for judging the Division of Enforcement's response.1 2 4 The CFTC concluded that the request was specific because it sought
the production of material arguably exculpatory as to either punishment or
guilt.: -5 The CFTC's determination, however, does not comport with the
definition of specific and general requests under the Brady doctrine. In Agurs,
the Supreme Court defined a specific request as one that gives the prosecutor
notice of exactly what the defense seeks J 2 6 For example, defendant's request for
a particular witness' pre-trial statements or for a certain piece of tangible physical evidence is specific.' 2 7 Requesting a list of witnesses or any oral or written
116. Id. at 24.335. The administrative law judge ordered the Division of Enforcement to

produce all exculpatory material. Id. at 24,334-35.
117. See id. at 24,335.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 24,341.

120. Once an agency has provided for a class of discovery, it must ensure that its legitimate scope is not circumvented or its purpose frustrated. See Gardner v. F.C.C., 530 F.2d
1086 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Swift &Co. v. United States, 308 F.2d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 1962).
121. See supra note 16; J. ABsmE, supra note 7, at 83.
122. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text. See also Adlerstein, Ethics, Federal
Prosecutors,and Federal Courts: Some Recent Problems, 6 HorsRA L. REv. 755, 774-75 (1978).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 55 and 56.
124. In re First Nat'l Corp. & Monex Int'l, Ltd., Nos. 79-56, 79-57, slip op. at 4 (CFTC
Nov. 12, 1981).

125. Id. at 3.
126. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 98 Idaho 209, 560 P.2d 880 (1977); State v. May, 339 So. Rd

764 (La. 1976).
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statements made by witnesses is not a specific request. 128 Nor is a defense request
for all Brady material or for anything exculpatory a specific request. 12 9
Although the specificity standard in First Guaranty is contrary to the Agurs
standard, it benefits respondents by placing a greater duty of disclosure on the
prosecution when the defense makes a simple request for all Brady material.
To encourage the Brady doctrine's application in administrative proceedings,
however, requests should be labeled specific only if they give the prosecution
notice of exactly what evidence is sought."30 Under this standard, divisions of
enforcement would be under no duty to search their files for evidence favorable to the accused.

13 1

Meeting the Standards for Disclosure
The scope of the Brady disclosure requirement is also limited by the type of
evidence the prosecution must produce. Since perusal of the prosecution's files
by defense counsel is prohibited, 3 2 the Supreme Court promulgated standards
of materiality for each category of Brady evidence to determine whether disclosure is warranted. 33 Regardless of the category of evidence under review,
however, the questionable material must initially meet dual standards for disclosure.134 Specifically, the evidence must be favorable to the accused, as well
as material to guilt or punishment. 35 Thus, evidence must clearly support the
6
accused's defense to necessitate disclosure."3

128. See Wayster v. Overberg, 560 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1977); People v. Jones, 66 Ill. 2d 152,
361 N.E.2d 1104 (1977).
129. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106-07.
130. Because administrative respondents lack effective pre-trial discovery devices, they
may be unable to make specific requests. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. But
see 17 C.F.R. §§ 10.42, .44 (1982) (Commodity Futures Trading Commission's Rules of Discovery). Pursuant to the CFTC rules, the administrative law judge has the discretion to order
the Commission staff and the respondent to outline their cases, setting forth the legal theories
upon which they will rely. Id. In addition, unless otherwise ordered, the Commission must
make available to the respondent prior to the hearing copies of documents obtained during
the commission's pre-complaint investigation, including transcripts of testimony, signed
statements and reports of interviews obtained during the investigation. Id. This material
could provide the basis for a specific request.
131. Even in the absence of a specific request, divisions of enforcement would have a
duty to disclose and they would ultimately be held accountable for favorable or exculpatory
evidence in their possession. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 (prosecutor should be presumed to
recognize value of highly probative evidence even if he has actually overlooked it).
132. E.g., Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107; Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972); United
States v. Miller, 529 F.2d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976); United
States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 173 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974).
133. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
134. For example, the standard of materiality applicable where defense counsel makes a
specific request is whether the evidence might affect the outcome of the trial. See supra notes
51-52 and accompanying text. In reaching this decision, the court must first be satisfied that
the evidence is favorable to the accused or exculpatory and material. See, e.g., United States
v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 1983); Ogle v. Estelle, 641 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir.
1981).
135. E.g., Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; United States v. Anderson, 574 F.2d 1347, 1353 (5th Cir.
1978). See also Comment, supra note 31, at 125 (favorability and relevance are two components
of materiality under Brady).
136. E.g., Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant must
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Under the Brady doctrine the prosecution must disclose not only evidence
substantially supporting the accused's case, but also evidence going to the
credibility of the prosecution's witnesses. 137 For example, the existence of an
immunity agreement between an enforcement division and a witness who incriminates the respondent may constitute impeaching evidence and consequently provide a basis for a Brady claim. 38 Nondisclosure of such evidence,
however, would violate Brady only if the witness' credibility was material to
respondent's guilt or punishment and the evidence was exculpatory in nature. 39
Another factor to consider in the disclosure determination is whether the
evidence is favorable or merely helpful to the accused. Brady does not create
a general duty to aid the defense in preparing its case; 40 therefore, evidence
that is helpful but not necessarily favorable to the respondent need not be disclosed. 14' A list of names and addresses of persons interviewed during the investigatory phase of the disciplinary proceeding may be helpful to the respondent in formulating a defense. Disclosure of such evidence, however, would
be required under Brady only when the enforcement division knew that such
42
persons possessed exculpatory evidence.
Timing of Disclosure
Once the administrative law judge determines that evidence should be disclosed under Brady, a secondary issue arises as to when disclosure should
demonstrate materiality of evidence to guilt-seeking process to establish Brady violation);
United States v. Van Maanen, 547 F.2d 50, 53-54 (8th Cir. 1976) (identity of informant need
not be disclosed unless the defense proves he had favorable, material evidence). Cf. Babcock,
FairPlay: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 1133, 1152 (1982) (Brady not violated where prosecution simply fails to give unearned aid
to defendant).
137. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
138. If a witness invokes the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, he may
nevertheless be compelled to testify if use immunity is given. See L. MERa~mLn, SEC INV=sTGATIONS (1976), reprinted in NEGOTIATING AND SETrLiNG ENFORCEMENT AcrIONS UNDER THE
SEcuRrrias LAws - 1976, at 7, 55 (P.L.I. 1976).
139. United States ex. rel. Marzeno v. Gengler, 574 F.2d 730, 738 (3d Cir. 1978) (undisclosed evidence impunging government witness's credibility would not have affected outcome of trial due to independent evidence against defendant); United States v. Pfingst, 490
F.2d 262, (2d Cir. 1973) (failure by prosecutor to disclose assurances made to government
witness would not have affected the outcome of the case), cert. denied, 417 US. 919 (1974).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161, 1168 n.11 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Brown, 582 F.2d 197, 199-200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978). Divisions
of enforcement would have no duty to provide the defense with information which it already
has or can obtain with diligence. See United States v. Young, 618 F.2d 1281, 1287 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 US. 844 (1980); United States v. Lampagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir.
1979); In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp. & Monex Int'l, Ltd., Nos. 79-56, 79-57, slip op. at 7
(CFTC Nov. 12, 1981).
141. "The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped
the defense ...
does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense." Agurs, 427 US.
at 109-10.
142. In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp. & Monex Int'l, Ltd., Nos. 79-56, 79-57, slip op.
at 7 (CFTC Nov. 12, 1981). See People v. Jones, 87 Misc. 2d 931, 387 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1976)
(evidence that complaining witness has died may be helpful but is not exculpatory and need
not be disclosed).
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occur. Although administrative respondents would prefer pretrial disclosure, 143
courts are split on the issue. One faction holds that Brady does not require disclosure before trial, 144 while other courts require disclosure as early as
possible.

1 45

From the agencies' perspective the stance against any pretrial disclosure is
more attractive. Agencies have consistently refused respondents adequate pretrial discovery devices by arguing that procedural technicalities impede administrative efficiency and the ability of the agency to perform its public
functions.146 In addition, the agencies may argue that early disclosure presents
potential dangers of jeopardizing the safety of prospective witnesses, enabling
the respondent to bribe or prepare perjured witnesses, or enabling the respondent to create a tailored defense. 147 When coupled with lower court decisions holding that Brady does not necessitate pretrial disclosure, agencies can
present a forceful argument against disclosure before trial.
The weight of authority, however, suggests that Brady's effectiveness would
be curtailed unless pretrial disclosure is made.14 8 Disclosure before trial provides
the best means for the defense to investigate and develop fully the favorable
evidence.14 9 Moreover, the ABA Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial require the prosecutor to promptly disclose any material
in his possession which tends to negate the guilt or punishment of the
accused. 6 0 Many courts thus recommend that the prosecutor disclose Brady
material as early as possible.? 51 One court held that the government must disclose in time to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in
the preparation and presentation of its case, even if this requires pretrial disclosure.'

5

2

Since the Supreme Court has failed to address this issue, lower courts have
143. In the absence of pretrial discovery rights, the respondent would, at least, derive
direct benefit from pretrial Brady disclosure.

144. See United States ex. rel. Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 939 (1975); United States v. Moore, 439 F.2d 1107 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v.

Conder, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1970); United States v. Sklaroff,
323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971). See also United States v. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (government opposed disclosure of Brady materials prior to trial because of
defendant's opportunity to fabricate a defense).

145. See United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d 867, 873 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v.
Elmore, 423 F.2d 775, 779 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Deutsch, 373 F. Supp. 289, 290-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
146. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
147. See United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 974 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
924 (1976); United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Note,
ProsecutorialDiscovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1012-22 (1972).
148.

See 8

J.

MooRu, W. TACCART, & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTICE

fT 10.08(2),

at

16-95 (2d ed. 1981) (on the basis of policy the Brady doctrine should require pretrial discovery); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant,
74 YALE L.J. 136, 149 (1964) (only time for the prosecutor to reveal evidence is pretrial);
Comment, supra note 31, at 112.
149. See United States v. Deutsch, 373 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
150.

ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

§§

11-2.1 to 2.2 (1980).

151. See supra note 145.
152. United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924
(1976).
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sought to establish a reliable test for determining when disclosure should
occur. 153 Late disclosure of Brady material at trial does not constitute auto-

matic error;' 54 however, courts have held that due process is violated when the
defendant can show that late disclosure prejudiced his case.155 Because any
arguably exculpatory material discovered before trial should be presented to
the administrative law judge to make the disclosure determination, the prejudice test could be applied in a balancing fashion to determine whether pretrial
or later disclosure is necessary.'5"
On one side of the balance, the judge should consider whether late disclosure of the evidence in question would result in an unfair trial for the respondent. Since the Brady doctrine is intended not to expand a defendant's
discovery rights but to prevent unfair trials,' 57 disclosure at any time would
satisfy Brady as long as the respondent receives a fair trial. Consequently, if
evidence is the type that requires pretrial disclosure to allow for full exploration and exploitation by defense, fairness considerations should tip the balance
58
in favor of pretrial disclosure.
On the other side of the balance, the judge must weigh the aforementioned
potential dangers of early disclosure1 59 In addition, the judge would have to
consider the agencies' policy of limiting pretrial discovery rights which arguably facilitates administrative efficiency and allows agencies to police effectively
their respective fields. 60 In light of these factors, the judge's determination
that the questionable evidence could be fairly and adequately utilized if provided during trial should tip the balance in favor of later disclosure.' 8 Thus,
rather than invoking a strict rule prohibiting or requiring pretrial disclosure
in all cases, the administrative law judge should balance the agency arguments
against pretrial disclosure and the Brady due process concerns to determine
when disclosure should be made.
ENFORCING THE Brady DOGTRINE:
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DIVISIONS OF ENFORCEMENT

The Supreme Court in Agurs announced standards of materiality to guide
153. See Note, supra note 54, at 691; see also Comment, supra note 31, at 117.
154. See United States v. Kaplan, 554 F2d 577, 580 (3d Cir. 1977) (delayed disclosure is
not per se reversible error); United States v. Miller, 529 F2d 1125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426

U.S. 924 (1976).
155. See United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 287 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Polisi,
416 F.2d 573, 577 (2d Cir. 1969).
156. The pretrial evidentiary hearing would concern the question of producibility of
the material as opposed to admissibility. Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963).
157. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107-08..
158. See Grant v. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1974) (evidence that robbery victim
identified someone other than the defendant should be disclosed pretrial to allow adequate
defense preparation); United States v. Deutsch, 373 F. Supp. 289, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Brady
requires pretrial production in some cases).
159. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
161. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements may fall into this category since such
evidence could be utilized during trial on cross examination. Cf. supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (Jencks Act allows late disclosure of evidence of prior statements by a
government witness).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV

prosecutors in their disclosure decisions and to ensure their compliance with
Brady disclosure requirements.162 The standards provide for a new trial in
certain instances when the prosecution conceals evidence discoverable under
the Brady doctrine.163 Commentators suggest, however, that the Agurs
standards provide a greater incentive to conceal evidence favorable to the defense than to resolve close questions in favor of disclosure.164
The application of Brady in the criminal arena provides little guidance to
the administrative field in fashioning standards of accountability by which a
division of enforcement's actions are judged.165 Such guidance, however, may
not be necessary since the Commodity Futures Trading Commission developed
a test to determine the adequacy of an enforcement division's compliance with
Brady requests. 166 In addition, the CFTC made clear that attorneys prosecuting with an enforcement division are held accountable to standards of professional conduct.16 7

In answer to the administrative law judge's order in First Guaranty to produce exculpatory material, the CFTC Division of Enforcement suggested
Brady did not apply to agency proceedings. 68 The Commission responded
that the Division of Enforcement must fully appreciate its obligation to disclose discoverable evidence to promote the fair and orderly administration of
justice.169 Moreover, in calling for compliance with Brady, the CFTC stressed
that the Division of Enforcement, as the Commission's prosecutorial arm,
should be above reproach in its litigation tactics. 170 The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility applies to attorneys within divisions of enforcement;
therefore, they have an obligation to set an example of professional conduct. 1
Although government counsel may prosecute vigorously and zealously, they
must comply with standards adequate to uphold the dignity of the government.172

In addition to stressing these ethical considerations, the Commission provided a procedural check for determining the Division's compliance with a
request for Brady materials. When the Division indicates, by affidavit or otherwise, that it has conducted a search for Brady material and that no such ma162. See generally sources cited supra note 31.
163. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 46.
165. The standards of materiality fashioned for criminal prosecutions are based on the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Because the preponderance of the evidence standard
is used in agency proceedings, the Agurs standards of materiality cannot be readily applied
to administrative adjudications. Compare notes 44-50 and accompanying text with note 100.
166. See First Guaranty, 2 CoSIM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 24,338.
167. Id. at 24,340 n.16.
168. Id. at 24,336 (the Division stated if no Brady materials, "assuming Brady is applicable to administrative proceedings').
169. Id. at 24,338.
170. Id. at 24,340 n.16.
171. The Preliminary Statement to the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY
(1979) states: "The Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless
of the nature of their professional activities." Id.
172. First Guaranty, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 24,340 n.16; see also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 7-13, DR 7-103 (1979).
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terial exists, the administrative law judge may rule the search and its findings
adequate if the judge finds the search was reasonably calculated to discover
any producible material' 3 When the respondent makes specific allegations of
noncompliance, however, the administrative law judge can conduct an inquiry
regarding the Division's search for Brady material. 17 The potential for this
judicial inquiry may provide sufficient incentive to divisions of enforcement
to disclose fully information coming within the purview of the Brady doctrine.
Even if the Brady doctrine is applied throughout the administrative field,
the ultimate effectiveness of the doctrine depends upon compliance by agency
attorneys. Presently, various agencies are under fire for their enforcement
techniques. 1' 5 One commentator has described enforcement practices at the SEC
as a deliberate pattern of serious and inexcusable violations of fundamental
rights and elementary notions of fairness.1 76 Open compliance with the Brady
disclosure requirements,, however, would further the agencies' stated policy of
fair and evenhanded enforcement in investigative and disciplinary proceedings.
CONCLUSION

Although the Brady doctrine was developed to prevent unfair criminal proceedings, the doctrine speaks in broader terms. Its underlying principles apply
to any judicial process which seeks to ascertain truth. The administrative
disciplinary hearing is an adversarial trial designed to serve such a truth-seeking function. The interests an administrative respondent has at stake are often
as vital as those of the criminal accused. Despite the importance of these interests, the administrative process affords the respondent very limited discovery rights. Moreover, the agency, in its multi-faceted role of investigator,
prosecutor, and ultimate decisionmaker, enjoys a tremendous adjudicative advantage. To offset this advantage and add an element of fairness to agency
disciplinary proceedings, the Brady doctrine should be implemented throughout the administrative field.
FREDERICK D. EvANs, III
173. In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp., & Monex Int'l, Ltd., Nos. 79-56, 79-57, slip op. at
6 (CFTC Nov. 12, 1981). The extent of the search for Brady materials is limited by certain
finite boundaries. Id. The Division of Enforcement has no duty to seek out evidence favorable
to the defense which is not in the possession of the agency. Id. The enforcement staff is under
no obligation to conduct an investigation as to the whereabouts of former Commission employees. Id. at n.8. It is not necessary that the enforcement staff personally search the files of
other Commission divisions. The Division of Enforcement may rely upon the assurances of
other Commission employees that producible material is not in the possession of their respective divisions. Id. at 7. See also United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 1102, 1116 (8th Cir.
1979); United States v. Evenchick, 413 F.2d 950, 953 (2d Cir. 1969). Cf. Turner v. Wyrick, 594
F.2d 1207, 1209-10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 856 (1979).
174. First Guaranty, 2 CoMm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) at 24,340 (quoting Williams v. United
States, 328 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1963)). According to Williams, the judge may inquire into the
extent of the search for requested materials by interviewing witnesses and making an in
camera examination of the statement. 328 F.2d at 180 (quoting Hilliard v. United States, 317
F.2d 150, 151 (1963)).
175. See Freedman & Sporkin, supra note 63, at 783-84; Sackheim, supra note 4 at 469.
176. Freedman & Sporkin, supra note 63, at 781.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

21

